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Abstract 
 
This study examines the dynamics and determinants of dividend payout policy of 320 non-
financial firms listed in Karachi Stock Exchange during the period of 2001 to 2006. For the 
analysis we use dividend model of Lintner (1956) and its extended versions in dynamic setting. 
The results consistently support that Pakistani listed non-financial firms rely on both current 
earning per share and past dividend per share to set their dividend payments. However, the 
dividend tends to be more sensitive to current earnings than prior dividends. The listed non-
financial firms having the high speed of adjustment and low target payout ratio show the 
instability in smoothing their dividend payments. To find out the determinants of dividend payout 
policy dynamic panel regression has been performed. It is found that the profitable firms with 
more stable net earnings can afford larger free cash flows and therefore pay larger dividends. 
Furthermore the ownership concentration and market liquidity have the positive impact on 
dividend payout policy. Besides, the investment opportunities and leverage have the negative 
impact on dividend payout policy. The market capitalization and size of the firms have the impact 
on dividend payout policy which shows that the firms prefer to invest in their assets rather than 
pay dividends to their   shareholders. 
 
JEL Classification: G32, G35 
Key words: Dividend policy, partial adjustment model, dividend dynamics, target payout, 
Dynamics panel data  
 
1. Introduction 
The behaviour of dividend policy is the most debateable issue in the corporate finance literature 
and still keeps its prominent place both in developed and emerging markets. Many researchers try 
to uncover the issue regarding the dividend behaviour or dynamics and determinants of dividend 
policy but we still don‟t have an acceptable explanation for the observed dividend behaviour of 
firms (Black, 1976; Allen and Michaely, 2003 and Brealey and Myers 2005). One of the well 
known explanations of dividend behaviour is the smoothing of firm‟s dividends vis-a-vis earnings 
and growth. In his seminal research, Lintner (1956) find that firms in the United States adjust their 
dividends smoothly to maintain a target long run payout ratio. Several studies appear after this 
work and evidence suggest that the dividend policy of the companies varies from country to 
country due to various institutions and capital market differences. 
The Pakistan‟s capital market and the economy have several important features for 
examining the dynamics of dividend policy. Firstly, Pakistan is moving towards the development 
and improving the economy position in the world since the 1980.
1
 The capital markets of Pakistan 
are much develops as before
2
. Many studies conclude that firms are likely to pay stable dividend 
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 The economic growth and revolution has been identified by many researchers. From being a poverty suffering and 
economically backward country in 1980 with the GDP per capita income of only US$680, it exceeded US$ 2600 in 
2007 that will show the much better shape then it was ever before. Pakistan‟s economy is 56.8% free, according to the 
assessment of 2008 which makes it the world 93
rd
 freest economy Pakistan is ranked 16
th
 out of 30 countries in Asia 
pacific region. 
 
2
 The Karachi StockExchange has witnessed an unprecedented growth in its infrastructure development and 
business. The market capitalization increased from Rs. 203.8 billion in 1992 to Rs. 469.2 billion in 1997. It then fell 
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during the high growth period and it is interesting to find that how dynamic dividend policy is 
determined in growing economy like Pakistan.  Secondly, due to weak corporate governance the 
ownership structure of Pakistani firms is often characterized by the dominance of one primary 
owner who manages a large number of affiliated firms with just a small amount of shares or 
investment which result in the agency conflict between the shareholders and the owner, where 
controlling shareholders confiscate value from minority shareholders and can influence the 
dividend policy easily. Thirdly, the tax environment in Pakistan is totally different as compare to 
developed markets. There is no capital gain tax
3
 on stocks in Pakistan while 10% withholding tax 
is charged on dividend incomes and it is important to mention here that if the firms earned the 
profit and not announced the dividend that the 35% of the income tax is charged by the 
Government of Pakistan. There is a possibility of differences in the tax system may influence the 
dividend policy and also influence the degree of dividend smoothing in Pakistan since this adverse 
tax treatment of dividend income is a more serious issue than the developed countries like United 
States. Fourthly, in the Pakistan the payment of dividend is voluntary. In Korea for example, it is 
mandatory for listed companies to pay the annual dividend divided by its face value at a level 
equal to the interest rate of one year time deposit. In fact, in Pakistan the many major investors are 
still disagreed with dividends and consider stock prices appreciation as the major component of 
stock returns therefore, it is assumed that investor attitude towards dividends is expected to have 
an impact on the way in which firms set their dividend policy in Pakistan. 
The theoretical and empirical evidences suggest that there are many firm specific factors 
related to governance related which play an important role in dividend signalling and agency cost 
explanation of dividend behaviour. The main focus of the study is to examine factors could 
empirically explain cross sectional differences in firm‟s dividend smoothing behaviour in 
Pakistani market. The main reason to examine the smooth dividends behaviour is that the firms‟ 
dividend behaviour affects it capital structure. Other objective is to explore the role of various 
determinants such as ownership concentration, profitability, liquidity, size, leverage and 
investment opportunities on the firms‟ dividend paying behaviour by using the sample of 320 non-
financial firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange listed for the period of 2001 to 2006. 
The present study is the first attempt up to the authors‟ knowledge to analyse the dynamics 
and determinants of dividend policy of Pakistan. It contributes to the limited literature in this area 
and extends the traditional framework of Lintner (1956), Fama and Babiak (1968) and the Belanes 
et al. (2007) and also compare different econometric approaches for modelling the dynamics of 
dividends according to the capital market of Pakistan. In addition several estimation techniques are 
applied to check the robustness in addition to dynamic panel data to examine the dynamics and 
determinants of dividend policy in Pakistan. The present study explores the factors involved in 
determination of dividend policies in Pakistan. We try to find out that the future earnings of the 
firms can be used for signal of dividends and controlling growth, firm size, cash balance, retained 
earnings, market capitalization. In Pakistan there are few firms which are paying dividend 
consistently. We try to find the answer to the questions why the listed firms of Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE) are not able to smooth their dividends and what are the factors which are 
influencing or determining the dividend policy in Pakistan.  
 
2. Literature Review 
During the last fifty years the several theoretical and empirical studies are done leading to the 
mainly three outcomes: the increase (decrease) in dividend payout affect the market value of the 
firm or the dividend policy of the firm does not affect the firm value at all. However, we can say 
that empirical evidence on the determinants of dividend policy is unfortunately very mixed. 
Furthermore there are numerous theories on why and when the firms pay dividends. Miller and 
                                                                                                                                                            
to Rs. 256 billion in 2001 but then increased to Rs. 595 billion in 2002. This further went up to 951 billion in 2003 
to 1474 billion in 2004 and 3065.8 billion in 2006. 
 
3
 The Government have given the extension till 2010 so before the 2010 no capital gain tax will be collected on stocks 
in Pakistan 
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Modigliani (1961) suggest that in perfect markets, dividend do not affect firms‟ value. 
Shareholders are not concerned to receiving their cash flows as dividend or in shape of capital gain, 
as for as firm‟s doesn‟t change the investment policies. In this type of situation firm‟s dividend 
payout ration effect their residual free cash flows and the result is when the free cash flow is 
positive firms decide to pay dividend and if negative firm‟s decide to issue shares. They also 
conclude that change in dividend may be conveying the information to the market about firm‟s 
future earnings. Gordon and Walter (1963) present the bird in the hand theory which says that 
investors always prefer cash in hand rather then a future promise of capital gain due to minimizing 
risk. The agency theory of Jensen and Meckling (1976) is based on the conflict between managers 
and shareholder and the percentage of equity controlled by insider ownership should influence the 
dividend policy. Easterbrook (1984) gives further explanation regarding agency cost problem and 
says that there are two forms of agency costs; one is the cost monitoring and other is cost of risk 
aversion on the part of directors or managers. The explanation regarding the signalling theory 
given by Bhattacharya (1980) and John Williams (1985) dividends allay information asymmetric 
between managers and shareholders by delivering inside information of firm future prospects. 
Miller and Scholes (1978) find that the effect of tax preferences on clientele and conclude different 
tax rates on dividends and capital gain lead to different clientele. Life Cycle Theory explanation 
given by the Lease et al. (2000) and Fama and French (2001) is that the firms should follow a life 
cycle and reflect management‟s assessment of the importance of market imperfection and factors 
including taxes to equity holders, agency cost asymmetric information, floating cost and 
transaction costs Catering theory given by Baker and Wurgler (2004) suggest that the managers in 
order to give incentives to the investor according to their needs and wants and in this way cater the 
investors by paying smooth dividends when the investors put stock price premium on payers and 
by not paying when investors prefer non payers. 
As regards the empirical literature the roots of the literature on determinants of dividend 
policy is related to Lintner (1956) seminal work after this work the model is extended by the Fama 
and Babiak (1968). D‟Souza (1999) finds negatively relationship between agency cost and market 
risk with dividends payout. However, the result does not support the negative relationship between 
dividend payout policies and investment opportunities. The empirical analysis by Adaoglu (2000) 
shows that the firms listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange follow unstable cash dividend policy and 
the main factor for determining the amount of dividend is earning of the firms. Omet (2004) 
comes to the same conclusion in case of firms listed on Amman Securities Market and further the 
tax imposition on dividend does not have the significant impact on the dividend behaviour of the 
listed firms. DeAngelo et al. (2004) document highly significant association between the decision 
to pay dividends and the ratio of earned equity to total equity controlling for size of the firm, 
profitability, growth, leverage, cash balance and history of dividends. In addition, the dividend 
payments prevent significant agency problems since the retention of the earnings give the 
managers‟ command over an additional access to better investment opportunities and without any 
monitoring. Eriotis (2005) reports that the Greek firms distribute dividend each year according to 
their target payout ratio, which is determined by distributed earnings and size of these firms. Stulz 
et al. (2005) observe significant association between decision to pay dividends and contributed 
capital mix.  
In investigating the determinants of dividend policy of Tunisian stock Exchange Naceur et 
al. (2006) find that the high profitable firms with more stable earnings can manage the larger cash 
flows and because of this they pay larger dividends. Moreover, the firms with fast growth 
distribute the larger dividends so as attract to investors. The ownership concentration does not 
have any impact on dividend payments. The liquidity of the firms has negatively impacted on 
dividend payments. In Indian case Reddy (2006) show that the dividends paying firms are more 
profitable, large in size, and growing. The corporate tax or tax preference theory doesn‟t appear to 
hold true in Indian context. Amidu and Abor (2006) find dividend payout policy decision of listed 
firms in Ghana Stock Exchange is influenced by profitability, cash flow position, and growth 
scenario and investment opportunities of the firms.  
 4 
Megginson and Eije (2006) observe that the dividend paying tendency of fifteen European 
firms decline dramatically over this period 1989 to 2003. The increase in the retained earnings to 
total equity doesn‟t increase the payout ratio, but company age does. They also find that the effect 
of catering the dividend systematically which is nor conclusive evidence of continent and wide 
convergence in dividend policy. Baker et al. (2007) reports that Canadian dividend paying firms 
are significantly larger and more profitable, having greater cash flows, ownership structure and 
some growth opportunities. Daniel et al. (2007) conclude that managers treat expected dividend 
levels as a vital earning threshold for Korean firms. Jeong (2008) identifies that the Korean firms 
make dividend payments on the basis of firm‟s stock face value which is very close to the average 
interest rate of deposits. The change in dividends is less likely to reflect change in fundamentals of 
the firms. They find the determinants of dividend smoothing, firm risk, size and growth factors 
play very important role in explaining the cross section of smoothing the dividend behaviour. The 
role of dividend as mechanism in countries with different legal system and distinct agency cost 
problem is studied by Farinah and Foronda (2005) and they find that the firms from Anglo Saxon 
tradition follow relationship between dividend and insider ownership the pattern of earning of 
negative-positive-negative and in civil law countries relationship is positive-negative-positive.    
There is an increasing interest in analyzing the dividend behavior of the firms after the 
introduction of Code of Corporate Governance by SECP in 2002 in Pakistan but many issues in 
this area are uncovered. In particular, the factors involve for determination of dividend policies 
in Pakistan, which is central issue of this area needs in depth research. It is in this perspective 
this study aims to make contribution in the literature on dividend policy. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
We start our analysis by empirically testing the partial adjustment model of Lintner (1956) 
According to the Lintner each firms i has target dividend payout ratio (ri). By using the target 
payout ratio Lintner calculated the target dividend at time (Dit*) as percentage of net earning of the 
firms i at the time t, the relationship is given below: 
itiit ErD 
* (Eit)                                                                                                                                   (1) 
In reality the dividend which firms finally pay at time t (Dit) is different from the target one (Dit*). 
Therefore, it is more reasonable to model the change between the real dividends at time t-1, 
instead of the real dividend at time t only. By taking the change in real dividend into account it is 
realistic and consistent with the long run target payout ratio, we assume that the real change in 
dividend at time t (Dit- Dit-1) equal to the constant portion (αi) plus the speed of adjustment to the 
target dividend at time t (Dit*- Dit-1). Since the target dividend at time t is a proportion of the net 
earnings at the time t, the final model become as follow: 
11   itiitiiitit DcErcDD                                                                         (2) 
Where Dit is the actual dividend paid by the firms during period t, Eit is the net earnings of the 
firms during the period t; ci is the adjustment factor which shows the speed of adjustment of 
dividends, at the time t-1, to optimum target payout ratio of dividends at time t and rt is the target 
payout ratio. This theoretical model can be estimated using the following econometric model: 
ittitit DED   121                                                                                                 (3) 
Where ∆Dit  is the change in dividend form time t-1 for the firm i,  β1  represents the ci  times rt of 
the theoretical model β2  is represent the variable ci of the theoretical model with negative sign (β2  
= -ci ) and εit  represent the error term.  
Fama and Babiak (1968) extend Lintner (1956) model by incorporating one more 
explanatory variable that is the difference between the current earnings and previous earnings of 
earnings without constant term:  
ittitit DED   121                                                                                   (4) 
Where Dit is the dividend of the firm i at the time t, ∆Eit the change in income to the stockholders, 
at the time t and the time t-1 and εit is the error term.  
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We estimate the above model by taking the ∆DPSit is the change in dividend per share of 
the firm i at the time t as dependent variable and ∆EPSit , is change in earning per share at the time 
t as explanatory variable and the model becomes as follow:  
121  titit DPSEPSDPS                                                                                   (5) 
In the empirical literature, the Lintner model is tested by using dividend per share data and the 
aggregate dividend data. We use dividend per share, total dividend and dividend yield data for 
more rigorous analysis. We use the earning per share after tax because dividend has been paid 
earning after interest, taxes and after depreciation and calculated as net earnings divided by 
number of shares.  
We also test the Lintner‟s extended version of dividend model incorporating a set of 
determinants that influence the dividend policy as proposed by Vasiliou and Eriotis (2003) and 
Belanes et al. (2007). The model is as follows 
 
itititit
ititititititit
MBVLEVSGSIZE
INVLIQMVOWNNEDYDY



 
10987
65432110
                                        (6) 
 
We use the dividend yield (DY) as dependent. The dividend yield is calculated as dividend per 
share divided by price per share. The set of determinants of dividend yield consist of following 
variables. The earning per share after tax (EPS) is used because dividend has been paid earning 
after interest, taxes and after depreciation and calculated as net earnings divided by number of 
shares. The major number of shareholders (OWN) is calculated as the shareholder having more 
than 5 percent holding and used as proxy of inside ownership structure. According to the Gomes 
(2000) and La Porta et al (2000) the solution of agency cost is the structure of ownership of the 
firms. Brav et al. (2004) argue that closely held firms regarding the consequences of dividend cuts 
and omission to be less serious. They find that closely held firms more likely to pay dividends in 
response to temporarily changes in earnings than the firm will diffused ownership. The net 
earnings after interest, depreciation and tax (NE) capture the role of earnings to pay dividends. The 
explanatory variable of tax has been included in the study to check the impact of corporate tax in 
the listed firms of Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) on the dividend payments. The leverage (Lev) 
also influence the dividend behaviour of the firm, if the level of the leverage is high its mean the 
firm is more risky in the cash flows. The negative effect of leverage on dividends payments is 
documented in the literature (Higgins, 1972 and McCabe, 1979). Rozeff (1982) finds that the 
firms with higher leverage pay lower dividends in order to evade the cost of raising external 
capital of the firm. The slack (INV) is the very important factor for the making the decision 
regarding dividend policy and it captures the investment opportunities available to firms. It is 
calculated as the accumulated retained earnings divided by total assets of the firm. According to 
the theory the presences of slack reduce the external financing requirements and become the 
important factor to solve the problem of the under investment. According to the Myers and Majluf 
(1984) and John and William (1985), it reduced the signalling need of the firms and incentives to 
smooth the dividend behaviour. The sales growth (SG) is included because according to the 
signalling theory the high growth firms are smoother to pay their dividends to shareholders. The 
firm size (SIZE) defined as natural logarithm of total assets is expected to have a positive affect on 
dividend payouts as large more diversified firm are likely to have very low chance of bankruptcy 
and can sustain higher level of debt. Scott and Martin (1975) find that the size of the firm can 
affect the firms‟ dividend policy and debt policy. The market capitalization (MV) is used in the 
study to capture value of the firm which plays very important role to determine the decision of 
dividend policy (Belanes et al., 2007). Market liquidity (LIQ) is one of very important factor that 
can effect the decision or behaviour of the dividend policy (Belanes et al., 2007). The return on 
assets (ROA) is added in the study as control variable and the characteristics of return on assets are 
as profitability of the firm. The return on assets is expected to be positively related to dividend 
yield (Belanes et al., 2007). The market to book value of equity (MBV) is the signal for the 
shareholders that firms pay dividends smoothly and vies versa (Bleans et al., 2007).  
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In Pakistan there are few firms which are paying dividend consistently. In order to 
investigate why the listed firms of Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) are not able to smooth their 
dividends and the factors which are influencing or determining the dividend policy in Pakistan, we 
test the following hypothesis. 
 
H1 : The Listed Firms of KSE  smooth or stable in paying dividends 
H2 : There is positive relationship between dividend payout and earnings 
H3: There is positive relationship between dividend payout and previous dividend payout. 
H4: There is positive relationship between dividend payout and net earnings 
H5: There is a positive relationship between dividend payout and ownership structure  
H6 : There is a positive relationship between liquidity and dividend payout. 
H7:  There is negative relationship between dividend payments and investment opportunities. 
H8 : There is negative relationship between dividend payout and leverage. 
H9 : There is negative relationship between dividend payout and size of the firms. 
 
Data 
For the study the sample of 320 non financial listed firms listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange 
(KSE) are selected. The 320 non financial firms cover the 85% of the total firms in the market 
(KSE and in 2007. The data is collected from Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan, State 
Bank of Pakistan and the Karachi Stock Exchange. The variables of the study are calculated from 
the Audited Annual Accounts
4
 of 320 firms for the period of 2001 to 2006 which is about 1830 
observations for each variable and it is a long period enough to smooth out variable fluctuations 
(Rozeff, 1982) 
The panel character of data allows us to use the panel estimation technique. The panel data 
estimations are considered most efficient analytical methods in handling of econometric problem 
such as omitted variables and edogeneity biases. To deal with this issue we apply the Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) as estimation technique. The lag dependent and explanatory 
variables are used as instruments following Arellano and Bond (1991). The Hausman (1978) test 
is used to make decision between fixed effect and random effect approaches. 
 
4. Empirical Results 
The analysis of this study divided into two parts, First part of the regression analysis shows the 
dividend stability of the non financial firms listed in Karachi Stock Exchange and the second part 
of the paper explain the determinants of dividend payout policy in Pakistan.  
 
4.1 Evidence on the Stability of Dividends 
For estimating the dividend stability we use three models: Lintner  (1956), Fama and Babiak (1968) 
and one we extended Lintner model with dividend per share and earning per share which is more 
suitable choice of  variables in case of Pakistani Market. To perform the econometrics analysis we 
apply four different methods to check the robustness of the model: Generalized Method of 
Moments (GMM), pooled time-series cross-section data with common effect (POOL), pooled data 
with fixed effect model (FEM) and pooled data random effect model (REM). 
Table1 reports the parameter estimates obtained for the dividend stability model. The 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable (dividend) α varies from 0.22 obtained from GMM 
estimations to 0.58 when ordinary least square level is used by pool, fixed effect random effect. 
Though the speed of adjustment (1-α) lies within the range of 41to 77.73 percent. This suggests 
that there are some unobserved individual firm‟s effects on the dividend smoothing behaviour 
which are not captured by this model and cause a large variation in the speed of adjustment. The 
coefficient of dividend declines from 0.58 to 0.27 in fixed effect method estimation which suggest 
the firm-specific factors effects in the dividend payout policy of Karachi stock exchange and the 
endogeneity is also an issue to deal with. Furthermore the coefficients of the dividends are 
                                                 
4
 List of Variables is provided in appendix Table A1 
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significant with the fixed effect method. The other useful statistics is the implicit target payout 
ratio which is shown in the above table of partial adjustment model. The target payout ratio (β/1-α) 
varies from 18 to 55 percent and the significantly lower then the target payout ratio observed from 
the data. The coefficient of the determination R
2
 is also varies from 0.39 to 0.65. 
 
Table 1: Evidence on Dividend Stability 
The table reports the results of extended dividend stability model of Lintner (1956) by applying GMM, pooled time 
series cross section data with common effect model (POOL), fixed effect model (FEM) and random effect model 
(REM). 
ittitit DED   121  
∆Dit is the change in dividend form time t-1 for the firm i 
Eit  is the net earnings of the firms during the period t  
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. The values in parenthesis are t-
statistics. 
 
Independent Variables GMM Pooled FEM REM 
Dit-1 0.23* 
(2.50) 
 
0.58* 
(30.10) 
0.27* 
(15.35) 
0.52* 
(35.82) 
Eit 0.25* 
(2.20) 
0.23* 
(7.29) 
0.13* 
(21.34) 
0.11* 
(3.66) 
R
2
 0.56 0.56 0.66 0.39 
Hausman Test (p-value)   0.002  
Speed of adjustment (1-α) 
 
77.33% 41.90% 72.70% 48% 
Target Payout Ratio (β/1- α) 32% 55% 18% 23% 
Firms 210 210 210 210 
Observations 1210 1344 1344 1344 
 
 
Table 2: Evidence on Dividend Stability 
The table reports the results of extended dividend stability model of Fama and Babiak (1968) by applying GMM, 
pooled time series cross section data with common effect model (POOL), fixed effect model (FEM) and random effect 
model (REM). 
ittitit DED   121  
Dit is the dividend of the firm i at the time t,  
∆Eit  the change in income to the stockholders at the time t and the time t-1. 
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-
statistics. 
 
Sample  
Independent Variables GMM Pooled FEM REM 
Dit-1 0.37* 
(1.97) 
 
0.37* 
(19.15) 
0.70* 
(36.3) 
0.38** 
(18.90) 
∆Eit  0.12 
(0.07) 
0.12* 
(33.20) 
0.13* 
(12.56) 
0.28* 
(22.17) 
R
2
 0.97 0.98 0.82 0.92 
Hausman Test (p-value)    0.001 
Speed of Adjustment (1-α) 59.01% 63.26% 52.41% 42.50% 
Target Payout Ratio β/1-(1-α) 27% 32.10% 38.49% 25% 
Firms 210 210 210 210 
Observation 1197 1322 1322 1322 
 
 
 8 
The above Table 2 shows that parameter estimates obtained from the dividend stability model 
modified by Fama and Babiak (1968). The result indicates that the coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable dividend α varies from 67 percent to 37 percent; the variation in the dividend 
coefficient is large in the Karachi Stock Exchange listed non financial firms. The result shows that 
the speed of adjustment also varies from 32 percent to 68.20 percent. On the other hand the target 
payout ratio is also not consistent, the target payout ratio vary from 19 percent to 44.60 percent 
which is lower then the observed target payout ratio of 25 to 38.50 percent. The coefficient of the 
determination of all four models (GMM, POOL,FEM and REM) vary from the 0.59 to 0.74. These 
results suggest that the KSE listed firms are not smooth to pay their dividends. These results are 
opposite compared with the findings of other developing markets for example Fama and Babiak 
(1968) in case of United States market observe that the speed of adjustment approximately 0.37 
which is little bit high from the Lintner (1956) who finds it is 0.30. However our findings are 
consistent with some developing market results for example Belanes et al. (2007) find in case of 
the Tunisian Stock Exchange the speed of adjustment is vary from 96.59 percent to 23.66 percent 
and the target payout ratio 14.12 to 52.96 percent and conclude that the hypothesis of dividend 
stability is rejected.  
 
Table 3: Dividend Stability Model   
The table reports the results of extended dividend stability model of Lintner (1956) modified by using dividend per 
share and earning per share. The GMM, pooled time series cross section data with common effect model (POOL), 
fixed effect model (FEM) and random effect model (REM) are used as estimation technique 
121  titit DPSEPSDPS   
∆DPSit is the change in dividend per share of the firm i at the time t. 
∆EPSit  is the change in earning per share of the firm i at the time t. 
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-
statistics. 
 
Independent Variables GMM Pooled FEM REM 
∆DPSt-1 0.41** 
(2.12) 
 
0.37* 
(19.20) 
0.48 
(29.40) 
0.58* 
(36.40) 
∆EPSit  0.16* 
(22.48) 
0.20 
(0.64) 
0.20 
(1.23) 
0.11** 
(1.65) 
 
R
2
 0.97 0.98 0.82 0.92 
Hausman Test (p-value)    0.001 
Speed of adjustment(1-α) 59.01% 63.26% 52.41% 42.50% 
Target Payout Ratio(β/1- α) 27% 32.10% 38.49% 25% 
Firms 210 210 210 210 
Observations 1197 1322 1322 1322 
 
After the analysis of the above models partial adjustment model and the model of Fama 
and Babiak (1968) we modify the model which by using the change in dividend per share as 
dependent variable and regress it on change in earning per share of current period and lagged term 
of change in dividend per share. The parameter estimates obtained from our dividend stability 
models are reported in above Table 3. The coefficient of the lagged term dividends α varies from 
40 percent by GMM estimation to 57 percent by OLS when it‟s used in levels. The balanced 
panels have been used to estimate the above mentioned model. The results of the model show that 
the speed of adjustment (1-α) lies within the range of 42.5 percent to 59.01 percent by GMM 
method which suggest that the estimate techniques use in the model are appropriate. The random 
effect estimation shows that the extensive firm specific effects in the dividend policy in Pakistan. 
The endogeneity of the explanatory variables coefficient of dividends is taken account of when 
GMM is used as estimation technique against OLS but the significant level is reduced when the 
GMM is used to however, the variation in the significance is very small. 
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On the other side the target payout ratio (β/1-α) which is also shown in the above table. 
The target payout ratio vary from 25 percent to 38.49 percent which is significantly equal to the 
observed target payout ratio which amounts to 30 percent in full sample and 35.7 percent in 
dividend paying firms sample. The coefficient of determination does not have the variation. The 
firms listed on Karachi stock exchange are continuously improving their target payout ratio by 
applying this model and we can say that the Pakistan‟s listed firms non financial are not smooth to 
pay their dividends. 
The results of the adjustment of the speed and the target payout ratio when compared with 
the findings in the empirical studies, the Fama and Babiak (1968) find that for non-financial US 
firms the average speed of adjustment approximately 0.37 slightly higher than Lintner (1956) 
findings of 0.30 and target payout ratio of 50% almost equal to the Lintner (1956). The Behm and 
Zimmerman (1993) for German listed firms find a speed of adjustment ranging from 0.13 to 0.58 
and the target payout ratio lies between 25 to 58 percent. Glen et al. (1995) find the speed of 
adjustment between 40 percent in Zimbabwe and 90 percent in Turkey and the target payout ratio 
between 30 percent and 40 percent. Belanes et al. (2007) find the speed of adjustment in Tunisian 
listed firms which is 23.66 to 96.59 percent and the target dividend payout ratio lies between 14 to 
52.96 percent. Our results regarding the speed of adjustment and target payout ratio are closer to 
findings of other developing markets for example Turkey and Tunisia however, less then the speed 
of adjustment and target payout ratio of Germany and United States. 
To sum up the test of the Lintner partial adjustment model and the modified model on the 
sample of Karachi Stock Exchange Listed non financial firms reject the null hypothesis that that 
dividend decision are not based on the long term target dividend payout ratio. However, there is an 
indication that the firms give the higher importance on stable dividend payout to signal their future 
profitability to minimize the agency cost. 
 
4.2 Determinates of Dividend Pay-out Policy 
As regards the determinants of dividend payout policy in Karachi Stock Exchange listed non 
financial firms, we use the lagged dividend yield as explanatory variable to examine the pervious 
effect of the dividend yield with other explanatory variables and dividend yield as the dependent 
variable because the sample having the firms with negative earnings. The set of variable used as 
determining factors include: NEit is net earnings defined as earning per share after tax, OWNit  is 
ownership structure defined as numbers of majority shareholders holding more then 5 percent of 
stocks, MBVit is market to book value of equity, LIQit is turnover defined as the value of stock 
traded/stock market capitalization, INVit is slack or investment opportunities defined as 
accumulated retained earnings/ total assets, SIZEit is size defined as natural logarithm of total 
assets,  SGit is sales growth defined as percentage change in sales and LEVit is defined as total 
debts/ current year value of equity MVit the logarithm of market capitalization. The analysis is 
done for two sets: dividend paying companies separately and on the sample of combined of both 
dividend paying and not-paying companies. The estimation is done by using the General Method 
of Moment (GMM), Pooled least square method (POOL), fixed effect Method (FEM) and 
Random Effect method (REM).  
The results presented in Table 4 are for the sample of dividend paying firms shows that the 
lagged dividend yield has a positive and highly significant relationship with the dividend yield of 
the current year by using the pool time series and cross-section with common effect model, fixed 
effect model and random effect model.  This evidence suggests that dividend yield of the current 
year depend on dividend yield of pervious year and is supported by the findings of Belans et al. 
(2007) and Amidu and Abor (2006) and opposite from the findings of Reddy (2006). The net 
earnings show the positive and significant association with the dividend yield indicates that the 
firms with the positive earnings pay more dividends. Therefore, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis and conclude that firms listed in Karachi Stock Exchange determining the amount of 
dividends according to the net earnings (profitability) of the firm. The evidence supported by 
Adaoglu (2000), Amidu and Abor (2006) and Belans et al (2007) and deviate from Jeong (2008). 
The number of majority shareholders (OWN) is positively and significantly linked with the 
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dividend yield indicating that the ownership concentration is positively affect dividend payout in 
Pakistani market. The firms listed in KSE with major shareholding (Inside) pay more dividends 
play important role to determine the dividend payout policies. This result leads to acceptance of 
the null hypothesis that there is positive relationship between dividend payout and ownership 
structure. The evidence supported by the findings of Farina and Fronda (2005), Amidu and Abor 
(2006) and contrast from the results of Belans et al. (2007).  
 
Table 4: Determinants of Dividend Pay-out Policy 
The table reports the results of determinants of dividend model based on sample of dividend paying firms, there are 
224 firms which pay dividend to shareholders 
itititit
ititititititit
MBVLEVSGSIZE
INVLIQMVOWNNEDYDY



 
10987
65432110
 
DYit is dividend yield is calculated as dividend per share divided by price per share 
NEit is net earnings defined as earning per share after tax   
OWNit  is ownership structure defined as numbers of majority shareholders holding more then 5% 
of stocks 
MBVit is market to book value of equity 
LIQit is turnover defined as the value of stock traded/stock market capitalization 
INVit is slack defined as accumulated retained earnings/ total assets 
SIZEit is size defined as natural logarithm of total assets. 
SGit is sales growth defined as percentage change in sales 
LEVit is leverage defined as total debts/ current year value of equity 
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-
statistics. 
 
Independent Variables GMM Pooled FEM REM 
DYit-1 0.03** 
(1.71) 
0.84* 
(12.27) 
0.71* 
(12.44) 
0.72* 
(58.37) 
NEit 0.17* 
(2.05) 
0.002* 
(6.70) 
0.001* 
(6.15) 
0.001* 
(5.27 
OWNit 0.003*** 
(1.53) 
0.001** 
(1.74) 
1.00*** 
(1.55) 
0.001 
(1.26) 
MVit 1.17* 
(5.05) 
-0.006* 
(-4.50) 
-0.002* 
(-4.00) 
-0.001*** 
(1.59) 
LIQit 2.07* 
(5.40) 
0.05* 
(3.85) 
-0.01* 
 (-2.29) 
0.01 
(0.44) 
INVit -0.71* 
(-2.53) 
-0.07* 
(-2.78) 
-0.15* 
(-11.94) 
-0.26* 
(-14.82) 
SIZEit -0.003*** 
(-1.43) 
-0.002* 
(-2.59) 
-0.001* 
(-2.69) 
-0.004 
(-1.05) 
MBVit 0.09* 
(2.00) 
0.03*** 
(1.57) 
0.009** 
(1.94) 
0.04** 
(1.97) 
SGit 0.003 
(0.06) 
-0.006 
(-0.27) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
0.002 
(0.81) 
Levit 0.06*** 
(1.45) 
0.001 
(1.15) 
-0.001* 
(-3.39) 
-0.001 
(-1.15) 
R
2
 0.39 0.67 0.93 0.92 
F-Statistic  273.78 8888.14  
J-Statistic 0.019    
Firms 224 224 224 224 
Observation 1158 1319 1315 1315 
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Table 5: Determinants of Dividend Model 
The table reports the results of determinants of dividend model based on full sample of KSE listed non-financial 
dividend and non dividing paying firms 
itititit
ititititititit
MBVLEVSGSIZE
INVLIQMVOWNNEDYDY



 
10987
65432110
 
DYit is dividend yield is calculated as dividend per share divided by price per share 
NEit is net earnings defined as earning per share after tax   
OWNit  is ownership structure defined as numbers of majority shareholders holding more then 5% 
of stocks 
MVit is market to book value of equity 
LIQit is turnover defined as the value of stock traded/stock market capitalization 
INVit is slack defined as accumulated retained earnings/ total assets 
SIZEit is size defined as natural logarithm of total assets. 
SGit is sales growth defined as percentage change in sales 
LEVit is leverage defined as total debts/ current year value of equity 
The *, ** and *** indicates the significance levels at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Values in parenthesis are t-
statistics. 
 
Independent Variables GMM Pooled FEM REM 
DYit-1 0.03*** 
(1.34) 
0714* 
(43.14) 
0.76* 
(13.36) 
0.76* 
(15.27) 
NEit 0.001* 
(4.97) 
0.001* 
(6.26) 
0.004* 
(5.37) 
0.004* 
(5.24) 
OWNit 0.003* 
(3.23) 
0.003* 
(8.77) 
0.004*** 
(1.32) 
0.001*** 
(1.36) 
MVit 0.003 
(1.13) 
-0.001** 
(-1.77) 
0.003* 
(0.34) 
-0.002 
(-0.55) 
LIQit -3.00* 
(-2.53) 
-0.24* 
(-12.89) 
-0.06 
 (-9.83) 
-.0.19* 
(-14.96) 
INVit -0.01* 
(-0.07) 
-0.07* 
(-2.78) 
-0.15* 
(-11.94) 
-0.26* 
(-14.82) 
SIZEit -0.001* 
(-3.24) 
-0.005*** 
(-1.38) 
-0.002** 
(-1.70) 
-0.001 
(-0.25) 
SGit -0.003* 
(-2.89) 
--0.004 
(--0.04) 
0.001* 
 (2.53) 
0.005 
(0.90) 
Levit -0.001 
(-0.41) 
-0.002 
(-1.26) 
-0.001* 
(-0.43) 
-0.001 
(-0.73) 
MBVit -0.002*** 
(-1.46) 
-0.002* 
(-10.26) 
-0.001*** 
(-1.34) 
0.002 
(1.07) 
R
2
 0.52 0.73 0.93 0.92 
F-Statistic (p-value) 0.01  0.00  
J-Statistic     
Firms 320 320 320 320 
Observation 1466 1824 1830 1830 
 
The results show that there is a negative and significant relationship between dividend 
payout and size. This result shows that large-sized firms prefer to pay less dividend; therefore, we 
fail to reject the null hypothesis that size has negative relationship with dividend payout. Belans et 
al. (2007), Jeong (2008) and Avazian et al (2006) come up with contradictory evidence. The 
relationship between the firm‟s liquidity and dividend is positive which explains that firms with 
more market liquidity pay more dividends. Reddy (2006), Amidu and Abor (2006) find opposite 
evidence and Belans et al (2007) have come up with the same conclusion. The relationship 
between the investment opportunities or slack and dividend payout policies is negative and highly 
significant with all four models. The firms with large financial opportunities pay less dividends. 
Therefore, we can say that growing firms with more investment opportunities pay less dividends 
to their shareholders in Pakistani market. The evidence supported by finding of Jeong (2008), 
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Baker et al. (2007) and opposite from the findings of Naceur et al. (2006) and Belans et al. (2007). 
The relationship between the leverage and dividend payout is mix and significant in two models 
and sales growth has no significant impact on divided payout in all four models. These results 
indicate that the leverage and sales growth are not the determinant of dividend payout policies in 
listed firms of KSE. Baker et al. (2007) find the same relationship however, Belans et al. (2007), 
Avizan et al. (2006) find in contrast a significant relationship. The coefficient of determination and 
the F-Statistics are consistent in all above models the results are consistent with the empirical 
studies on determinants of dividend payout policy.  
The model of determinants of dividend payout policy is also use to make the estimation for 
full sample and we come up identical findings as we get with sample of dividend paying firms. 
The results reported in Table 5 show that the lagged dividend yield has a positive relationship with 
the dividend yield of the current. The net earnings positively affect the dividend yield. The firms 
listed in KSE with major shareholding pay more dividends play important role to determine the 
dividend payout policies. As regards the financial characteristic of the firm size, it has negative 
association with dividend payout ratio. The relationship between the investment opportunities, 
market to book value and liquidity with dividend payout policies are negative and significant 
indicating that the firms with large investment opportunities, more market to book value and with 
more liquidity pay less dividends. The growth of the firm has no clear association with the 
dividend payout policy. The relationship between the leverage and dividend payout is negative and 
insignificant by using all the models so we conclude that the leverage is not the determinant of 
dividend payout policies in listed firms of KSE.  
The robustness test consists on the sample of dividend paying firms. The dividend stability 
and the determinants of dividend payout policy in the KSE are presented in the modified model. 
The results of our study indicate that both lagged dividend per share and change in earning per 
share depends on mostly on the pervious earning per share. However the target dividend payout 
ratio is vary from 25 to 38.50 percent and the speed of adjustment varies from which is high with 
comparing to Turkey, US and Germany but low compare to developing markets like Tunisia, 
Ghana and Zimbabwe. These findings confirm the absence of dividend smoothing in Karachi 
Stock Exchange as calculated by Lintner (1956) for US market and finds it 30 percent slightly 
smoothing their dividends. As for as the determinants of dividend payout ration are concerned, the 
results of dividend paying firms are almost identical to the results of full sample firms. The lagged 
dividend yields of this time (t-1) have positive influence on current dividend.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We attempt to find the answer of the following questions: Do the firms listed in Karachi Stock 
Exchange follow the stable dividend payout policies? And what are the main factors that 
determine the dividend payout policies in listed firms of Karachi stock exchange? 
The first part of the study, Lintner‟s, Fama and Babiak and a modified model which is the 
extension of the partial adjustment model is applied using the static and panel data regressions. 
Our results shows that Pakistan‟s listed firms rely more on the current earnings that past dividend 
to fixed their dividend payments in this way the dividends tends to be more sensitive to current 
earnings and also on the prior dividends. The variability in the earnings of the firms is reflected in 
the level of dividends. The high variation in the speed of adjustment in the both models Lintner‟s 
and Fama and Babiak is tested by using panel regression analysis with four techniques: GMM, 
pool with common effect model, fixed effect model and random effect model. The variations in 
the speed of dividend paying firms are 42.50 to 63.26 percent which is high. This suggests the 
listed firms Karachi Stock Exchange do not smooth in paying their dividends. Additionally, the 
target payout ratio is very low 25 to 38.50 percent with the sample of dividend paying firms. 
Therefore, low target payout ratio and high speed of adjustment shows the trends towards the low 
smoothing and instability of dividend payout policies in Pakistan. 
The second part of the study is highlighted some determinants that may influence the 
dividend payout policies. The results show that the firms having high profitability with stable 
earnings can afford larger free cash flows thus pay out larger dividends. The firms with larger 
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investment opportunities can easily influence and play important role to determinant of dividend 
payout policies in Pakistan. The ownership structure has the major impact to determine the 
dividend payout policy in Pakistan. The firms with the major inside share holdings pay more 
dividends to its shareholders in Pakistan, which means the firms with high inside ownership or 
major inside shareholding pay dividend to reduce the cost associated with agency conflict. 
Moreover, the growth of the firms does not have any impact on the dividend payout and this result 
is not agreed with the informative content of dividends. The market liquidity of the firms has a 
positive influence which confirms that firms with higher market liquidity pay more dividends. The 
size is the highly negative and significant which shows that the large-sized firms invest in their 
assets rather then paying dividends to its shareholder, the results of our study generally support the 
pervious empirical studies on the determinants of dividend payout policy. 
 One implication of our findings is that pro-growth polices generate more profitable 
investment opportunities and stimulate the financing needs of the corporations and leads the firms 
to distribute less and use the retained earning for expanding the corporations. Therefore large sized 
firms with more profitable investment opportunities want to rely less on external financing and 
more on retained earnings. Other implication that comes out from our study is that ownership 
structure has significant impact on dividend payout policy in Pakistan. The inside ownership is 
positively associated with the growth of dividends. When legal environment does not provide 
sufficient protection for outside Investors, entrepreneurs and original owners are forced to 
maintain large positions in their companies which resulted in concentration of firm ownership. The 
countries like Pakistan with poor investor protection corporate ownership have significant impact 
on dividend policy. Ownership concentration appeared to be more important tool to resolve 
agency conflict between controlling and minority shareholders when investor protection is weak. 
Furthermore it is important to mention here that the high relationship of ownership of major 
shareholders can create the block of holders which may be easily influence the dividend payout 
policy in Pakistan. The Securities Exchange Commission of Pakistan has to proper manage the 
shareholding pattern of the listed firms of Karachi Stock Exchange, Lahore Stock Exchange and 
Islamabad Stock Exchange. 
This paper contributes to the literature of dynamics of dividends and determination of dividend 
payout policies, where we find significant effect of ownership on dividend payouts in case of 
emerging markets like Pakistan. There is a need to further analyze this issue with respect to 
corporate governance and the dividends payout policy. Examining the dynamic and determinants 
of dividend payout policy in relation with corporate governance would be an important and 
interesting exercise at the time when Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan wants to 
revise the Code of Corporate Governance. 
 
 
References 
 
[1] Allen F., and R. Michaely, 2003, Payout Policy, Handbook of the Economics of Finance. 
[2] Aivazian , V. L. Booth, and S. Cleary, 2003, „Do emerging market firms follow different 
dividend policies from U.S. firms‟, The Journal of Financial Research 26, 371-3 87. 
[3] Arellano M. and S. Bond, 1991, „Some tests of specification for panel data: Monte Carlo 
evidence and an application to employment equation, Review of Economic Studies 58, 277-
297 
[4] Berkley R. and S. Myers, 2005, Principles of corporate finance (8th edition), London: 
McGraw-Hill. Black F., 1976, „The Dividend Puzzle‟, Journal of Portfolio Management, 2, 
5-8. 
[5] Bhattacharya S., 1979, „Imperfect information, dividend policy and the bird in the hand 
fallacy‟, Bell Journal of Economics 10, 259-27. 
[6] Baker, Malcolm and Jeffrey ,Wurgler, 2004,  „A catering theory of dividends‟, Journal of 
Finance 59, 1125-1165 
 14 
[7] Baker.Kent. H. Saudi‟s, Dutta. Gandhi. D, „the perception of dividend by Canadian 
managers: new evidence‟, International Journal of Managerial Finance, vol.3, 2007. 
[8] De Angelo, Harry, Linda DeAngelo, and Douglas J. Skinner. 2004. „Are dividends 
disappearing? Dividend concentration and the consolidation of earnings‟. Journal of 
Financial Economics 72, 425-456. 
[9] De Angelo, Harry and Linda DeAngelo and René M. Stutz (2006) Dividend Policy and the 
earned/contributed capital mix: a test of the life-cycle theory, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 81, 227 
[10] D Suza. J., „Agency cost, Market Risk, Investment opportunities and dividend Policy‟, 
Journal of Manager Financials, vol 25, Nov 1999. 
[11] Elsevier Abov. J., Amidu. M., „Determinants of dividend payout ratios in Ghana‟, Journal 
of Risk Finance, Vol 7, 2006 
[12] Easterbrook, Frank H., Two Agency- Cost Explanations of Dividends,” American 
Economic Re view, Vol. 74, September 1984, 650- 659 
[13] Eriotis. Nikolaos, „The Effect of distribution Earnings and size of the firm to its dividend 
policy‟, International & economics Journal, 2005. 
[14] Eije.von.Henk. Muggings William, „Dividend policy in the European union‟, Journal 
International Finance, Vol 2, 2006. 
[15] Fama E. and Babiak H., 1968, „Dividend policy of individual firms: an empirical analysis‟, 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 63, 1132-1161. 
[16] Fama, Eugene F. and Kenneth R. French. 2001. Disappearing dividends: Changing firm 
characteristics or lower propensity to pay? Journal of Financial Economics 60, 3-43. 
[17] G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stutz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of 
Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 7, 337-429 
[18] Gordon, M.J. 1963, „Optimal investment and financing policy‟, Journal of Finance, Vol. 
18 No. 2, 264-72. 
[19] Jensen M.C., 1986, „The Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow: Corporate Finance and 
Takeovers‟, Journal of American Economic Review, 76, 323-329. 
[20] Lease, R.C., John, K., Kalay, A., Loewenstein, U. and Sarig, O.D., 2000, „Dividend Policy: 
Its Impact on Firm Value‟, Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA. 
[21] Miller M. and F. Modigliani, 1961, “Dividend policy, growth and the valuation of shares”, 
Journal of Business 34,411-433.  
[22] Miller, M. and Scholes, M., 1978, „Dividends and taxes‟, Journal of Financial Economics, 
Vol. 6 No. 4, 333-64. 
[23] Megginson.Willaim, „Dividend policy in the European Union‟, working paper series, 2006. 
[24] Nickell S., 1981, „Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects‟ , Econometrica 49, 
1417-1422 
[25] Nacelur. B. S, Goad‟s, Beelines, 2007,„On the determinants and Dynamics of Dividend 
policy‟, Journal of international review of finance. 
[26] Omet. G., „Dividend Policy Behaviour in the Jordanian Capital Market‟, International 
journal of Finance, 2004. 
[27] Rubin. A., „Ownership Concentration and liquidity‟, Journal of Financial Market, 2006. 
[28] Xu. Zhaoxia, Booth laurnace, „Who smooth Dividends‟, Journal managerial Finance, 
2006. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 15 
Appendix 
Table1: Set of Variables 
Financial Characteristics  Explanatory Variables 
Profitability   NE Net Earnings  and Earning Per Share after tax   
Signals  MBV 
SG 
Market to Book Value of equity 
Growth in term of Sales  
Ownership OWN Numbers of majority shareholders holding more 
then 5% of stocks 
Leverage LEV Total debts/ current year value of equity 
Sales Growth SG Percentage change in sales 
   
Size  MV 
 
 
SIZE 
Market capitalization is defined as  number of share 
outstanding in the market times the current market 
price of the shares 
Size in term of total assets  
Market liquidity  LIQ Annual value of stock traded/stock market 
capitalization  
Investment opportunities  INV Accumulated retained earnings/ total assets. 
Return on Asset ROA Net income divided by total assets 
   
 
 
 
